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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, defendants respectfully submit this petition for 
rehearing to raise certain matters defendants believe the 
Court's September 6, 1990 Opinion (a copy of which is attached 
hereto as Addendum "A") overlooked or misapprehended. These 
matters are summarized as follows: 
I. The very first argument raised in defendant's 
brief on this appeal was that plaintiffs arguments on the 
validity of the jurat in its notice of mechanic's lien were not 
timely raised in the District Court, were not considered by the 
District Court for that reason, and, therefore, are not proper-
ly before this Court. Yet, the Court's opinion fails to 
address whether the issue of the validity of the jurat may be 
considered on this appeal. 
II. In ruling that plaintiff's blanket notice of lien 
was valid and not misleading or prejudicial to defendants, the 
Court overlooked the following points: 
A. As argued in defendants* brief, the work 
under the two contracts was started and completed at different 
times, with work on the second contract not beginning until 
about the time that work under the first contract was com-
pleted. Yet, the notice (sworn to under oath) claimed work 
commenced as of the beginning of the first contract and work 
was completed at the end of the second cbntract. As will be 
discussed, this defect is important in terms of lien priority, 
and timeliness of the filing of the notice of lien and the 
lawsuit. 
B. The arguments in defendants' brief on 
plaintiffs duty to allocate the amount of its claim among the 
various buildings, units and contracts were based on the 
prejudice to defendants from plaintiffs failure to allocate in 
the notice. As noted in the Court's opinion, plaintiff cannot 
assert its entire claim against each building or unit. 
Instead, it must assert a proportionate claim. From the 
notice, none of the defendant lenders could determine what 
payment would be required to clear title on individual units 
subject to their respective security interests. 
III. The Court's ruling on the statute of limitations 
issues raised by Valley Bank means that if a lis pendens is 
recorded (or a non-party learns of the action) within the 
one-year period prescribed by Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11 (1953 as 
amended), there is no statute of limitations as to joinder of 
the non-party defendant. A lien claimant could file suit 
against only one of several persons with an interest in real 
property, record the lis pendens, not prosecute the suit, and 
cloud the title of the non-parties for years. This is contrary 
to the purposes of the one-year jurisdictional statute of 
limitations also found in § 38-1-11. The statute should be 
interpreted to extend the limitation period only if a non-party 
acquires a property interest after the lis pendens is recorded 
or after learning of the suit. This is especially true here, 
where Valley Bank's security interests were of record at the 
time the suit was filed, and no justification was offered by 
plaintiff for the failure to join Valley Bank during the 
one-year period. 
IV. The Court also overlooked several of defendants* 
arguments on the issue of attorneys' fees that will be 
discussed below. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT'S OPINION OVERLOOKED THE ISSUE OF 
WHETHER THE VALIDITY OF THE JURAT WAS PROPERLY 
BEFORE THE COURT. 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment was heard in 
the District Court on March 21, 1986. At the hearing, the 
Court granted plaintiff leave to file a memorandum within five 
days, addressing the validity of the jurat. R. 683, 698. 
Plaintiff failed to file a memorandum. Accordingly, on 
March 28, 1986, the Court entered its Memorandum Decision 
ruling that the jurat, and therefore the notice of lien, were 
invalid. R.684. On April 9, 1986, defendants mailed a 
proposed Order to plaintiffs counsel. R.702. On April 15, 
plaintiff's counsel (Ellen Maycock) withdrew, and on April 16, 
new counsel for plaintiff (Robert Babcock) entered his 
appearance. R.692, 695. Nonetheless, no objection was made to 
the Order, and it was entered on April 21, 1986. R.698. 
Notice of Entry was served by mail on May 6, 1986. R.723. 
In the meantime, plaintiff filed a motion to 
reconsider on May 1, 1986, arguing for the first time that the 
jurat was valid. R. 704. No reason was given for why 
plaintiff failed to file its memorandum in a timely fashion or 
why the Court should consider plaintiffs dilatory arguments. 
Accordingly, on May 7, 1986, the Court ordered that the motion 
to reconsider be stricken, stating that "The Court feels there 
is no just cause for bringing such a motion before the Court." 
R.726. Attached hereto as Addendum "B" is a copy of the May 7, 
Minute Entry. 
All of these facts were set forth in defendants* brief 
on this appeal at pp. 9-10 and were the basis for defendants' 
first argument at pp. 15-16 that the issue of the validity of 
the jurat was not properly part of this appeal. Nonetheless, 
this Court's September 6 Opinion fails to mention these facts 
and arguments, and defendants must assume they were overlooked. 
While Utah civil procedure does not recognize a motion 
to reconsider, the District Court has inherent authority to 
reconsider a non-final decision, until a final Order is 
entered. See, Salt Lake City Corporation v. James Construc-
tors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah App. 1988). However, it is 
within the District Court's discretion not to entertain a 
motion to reconsider, where no proper reason for reconsidera-
tion is given. Id. 
Here, the District Court had no power to grant the 
motion to reconsider, since a final order, certified pursuant 
to Rule 54(b), had been entered ten days earlier. Moreover, 
even if the Court had treated the motion as one for amendment 
of judgment under Rule 59(e), the Court still had the dis-
cretion not to consider it because it merely raised those 
arguments plaintiff had been given the opportunity to make, and 
failed to make, several weeks earlier. It was certainly not an 
abuse of discretion for the Court to strike the motion, where 
no justification was offered for plaintiffs failure to assert 
its arguments in a timely fashion. 
Moreover, the fact that the motion was stricken, 
rather than merely denied, as well as the Court's explanation 
for its ruling in the May 7 Minute Entry, shows that the Court 
did not even consider plaintiff's arguments, because they were 
not properly before the Court. Since these arguments were not 
properly before the District Court, they are not properly part 
of this appeal. Utah County v. Brown, 672 P.2d 83 (Utah 1983) 
(reversing lower court on other issues). 
In effect, by failing to assert its arguments in a 
timely fashion, plaintiff conceded, or waived its right to 
contest, the invalidity of the jurat. 
II. 
THE COURT'S OPINION OVERLOOKED THE MISLEADING AND 
PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OF PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO 
SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLY WITH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS 
IN FILING A BLANKET NOTICE OF LIEN. 
A. Effect of the Failure to Allocate Starting and 
Completion Dates Between the Separate Contracts. 
Plaintiff's Notice of Lien (addendum "A" to 
defendants' brief on file) alleged that the first work was 
performed on October 10, 1982 and the last work was performed 
on October 7, 1983. However, in discovery, plaintiff admitted 
that the work under the second contract (on units 3 through 8 
as identified in the Court's opinion) did not begin until 
April 23, 1983. R. 467. 
Section 38-1-7 as it read at the time of recording of 
plaintiff's Notice of Lien (See, Addendum ME" to defendants' 
brief on file) required the notice to state the dates upon 
which the first and last work were performed (and to give a 
description of the contract). One purpose of these 
requirements is to notify those claiming an interest in the 
property of the date from which the superpriority given to 
mechanic's liens is claimed, i.e., the date work commenced. 
The purpose for requiring the date work ceased is so one can 
determine whether the notice and any subsequent lawsuit are 
timely filed. Plaintiff's failure to follow these requirements 
frustrated these purposes and was misleading and prejudicial. 
The work on the first contract was on two different 
units (units 1 and 2, as identified in the opinion), which did 
not benefit the other units constructed under the second 
contract. See, Rotta v. Hawk, 756 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1988). 
Accordingly, plaintiff was not entitled to "tack" the priority 
of the lien for work done under the second contract to the 
priority of lien for the work done under the first contract, as 
it attempted to in the Notice of Lien. Id. 
Similarly, units 1 and 2 presumably were completed by 
about April 23, 1983, when the work under the second contract 
began. Therefore, the time for filing the Notice of Lien and 
commencing a lien foreclosure action on units 1 and 2 began to 
run then, not on October 7, 1983, as alleged in the Notice of 
Lien. Accordingly, plaintiff's Notice of Lien recorded on 
November 15, 1983 may not have been timely as to units 1 and 2, 
since at that time the prime contractor had to record that 
notice within 100 days of completion of its work, under 
§ 38-1-7. Also, the March 16, 1984 foreclosure action itself 
may not have been brought within the one-year period prescribed 
by § 38-1-11/ depending on the exact date upon which units 1 
and 2 were completed. 
Accordingly, both Valley Bank and Copper State Thrift, 
holders of security interests in units 1 and 2, were misled by 
the failure of the notice to specify when work under the first 
contract was completed. An interested party ought to be able 
to determine statutorily-required facts from the notice (or at 
least the fact that there were two contracts with different 
starting and completion dates), without being forced to incur 
attorneys' fees in discovery to ferret them out, and is 
prejudiced by its inability to do so. 
B. Effect of the Failure to Allocate the Amount 
of the Claim Among the Separate Contracts 
and Units or Buildings. 
The provisions of § 38-1-7 in effect at the time of 
recording of the Notice of Lien required the notice to include 
the amount of the claim. The obvious purpose of this 
requirement is to advise those with interests in the property 
of the amount required to release the lien and clear title. 
Defendants submit that this requirement, coupled with the 
allocation requirements of § 38-1-8 on separately-owned 
buildings, and the allocation requirements of § 57-8-19 on 
separate condominium units, required the notice to allocate the 
amount of the claim among the separate buildings or units. 
Defendants also submit that the Court overlooked the importance 
of these requirements where, as here, the work was performed 
under different contracts, and there are different defendants 
with security interests in the various buildings or units. 
At page 16 of its opinion, the Court notes that 
although the blanket lien arose prior to recordation of the 
condominium declaration (which in turn was recorded prior to 
the notice of lien), § 57-8-19 transformed the lien into a 
proportionate lien against each unit. At pp. 16 and 17, the 
Court then questions why, on similar facts, court decisions in 
another jurisdiction only require the notice to allocate if the 
work is done under separate contracts. Defendants believe 
these decisions are sound for the following reasons: 
1. Pursuant to § 57-8-19(2) (and similar condominium 
statutes in other states) if several units are built under a 
single contract, the amount of the lien claim against each unit 
is based upon the percentage interest of that unit set forth in 
the condominium declaration. Because there is a single 
contract, each unit owner (or security holder) can determine 
the amount of the claim attributable to its unit simply by 
applying that percentage to the total amount claimed in the 
notice of lien, and there may be no need to allocate. 
2. However, if, as here, some of the units are built 
under one contract, some are built under a second contract, and 
the notice fails to allocate the amount claimed under each 
contract, an owner/security holder cannot determine the amount 
of the claim attributable to its individual unit. This is 
because the amounts owed under the two contracts may be (and 
probably are) different. In an extreme case, all of the money 
may be owed under one of the contracts, and there would be no 
basis at all for clouding the title of the units covered by the 
other contract. While there may be no prejudice, even under 
this scenario, if all of the units, or all of the security 
interests in those units, are owned by the same party, there is 
prejudice where, as here, there is different ownership. See, 
Utah Savings and Loan Association v. Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 
366 P.2d 598 (Utah 1961). A secured party ought not have to 
retain an attorney to conduct discovery simply to determine the 
amount of the lien claim attributable to the secured unit, 
where the statutes required this amount to be stated in the 
Notice of Lien. 
C. Summary of Statutory Defects Attributable to the 
Failure of Plaintiff's Notice of Lien to Allocate 
Among the Separate Units and Contracts. 
At page 5, n.2 of its opinion, the Court stated: "The 
Banks do not argue that Projects completely failed to comply 
with any of the particular requirements of . . . § 38-1-7." To 
the contrary, that is exactly what defendants argued, and 
continue to argue here.—' Plaintiff's failure to allocate 
misstated the information sought by most of the statutory 
requirements then in effect, including: 
1/ It should be noted that plaintiff chose not to address the 
merits of its blanket Notice of Lien in either of its 
briefs on this appeal. 
1. The amount of the claim as to each unit or 
contract; 
2. The terms of the two contracts; 
3. The time when work commenced under the second 
contract; 
4. The time when work ended under the first 
contract; and 
5. The property subject to the lien. 
If only one of these defects existed, perhaps the 
Court's ruling would be justified. Cumulatively, however, they 
represent substantial noncompliance with statutory requirements. 
At page 7 of its Opinion, the Court defines the substantial 
compliance issue as whether the notice "compromised a purpose of 
the mechanic's lien statute". Certainly, the main purpose of the 
statute is to provide accurate information from which a property 
or security holder can determine the nature of the cloud on its 
title. It is not substantial compliance merely to file a form 
containing the statutory elements, where the information provided 
is wrong or misleading. If, as defendants argue, the notice did 
not substantially comply with the statute, defendants were 
prejudiced by plaintiff's recording of an unjustified cloud on 
their security interests.-x 
2/ At p. 15, the Court stated that, " . . . the lien is valid, 
at least as between the parties to this appeal." This 
overlooks that there may be other issues concerning the 
validity of the lien that were not raised by defendants' 
motions and that should be left for determination on remand. 
III. 
THE COURT'S OPINION MISAPPREHENDED THE PURPOSES OF THE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS APPLIED TO 
JOINDER OF NEW DEFENDANTS IN A MECHANIC'S LIEN ACTION, 
At pages 17-20 of its Opinion, the Court concludes 
that the only logical interpretation of § 38-1-11 permits 
joinder of any new defendant after expiration of the one-year 
limitation period, if a lis pendens was recorded within that 
period, or if the newly-added defendant acquired actual 
knowledge of the lawsuit within that period. The Court reasons 
that, otherwise, there would be no purpose for the statutory 
provisions regarding the lis pendens or actual knowledge of the 
lawsuit. However, this interpretation ignores the distinction 
between those who acquire an interest in the liened property 
before recording of the lis pendens or learning of the suit and 
those who acquire an interest afterwards. This distinction 
leads to an interpretation of the statute more persuasive than 
that adopted by the Court. 
The purpose of a lis pendens is to notify persons who 
acquire an interest in the subject property after the recording 
of the lis pendens. See, Mack v. Augustine, 416 P.2d 436, 443 
(Ariz. App. 1966). A lis pendens, or even actual knowledge of 
the lawsuit, is meaningless to one who acquires an interest in 
property before the lis pendens is recorded, or before learning 
of the lawsuit, or, as in the case of Valley Bank, before even 
the notice of lien is recorded. Accordingly, defendants' 
suggest that the lis pendens and actual knowledge provisions of 
§ 38-1-11 were never intended to apply to those in the position 
of Valley Bank. 
Instead, the statute should be interpreted as allowing 
joinder of a non-party after the one-year period only if that 
non-party acquired its interest either after the recording of 
the lis pendens or after obtaining actual knowledge of the 
lawsuit. Otherwise, the statute makes no sense. 
This interpretation, not the Court's September 6 
interpretation, is consistent with both prior Utah law and the 
law of other jurisdictions. At p. 18, n. 13 the Court suggests 
that under AAA Fencing Company v. Raintree Development and 
Energy Company, 714 P.2d 289 (Utah 1986), § 38-1-11 is not a 
true statute of limitations. That is correct. It is more than 
a statute of limitations; it is a jurisdictional bar to those 
who file tardy claims. The reason AAA Fencing gives the 
statute even greater force than a statute of limitations is to 
limit the cloud on title created by a lien that is already 
given superpriority. The Court's present decision here does 
just the opposite by extending the cloud on title for no good 
reason, especially since Valley Bank's security interests here 
were of record at the time the lawsuit was filed. 
In reaching its decision in AAA Fencing, this Court 
relied on two Colorado decisions, Cox v. Bankers Trust Co., 570 
P.2d 6 (Colo. App. 1977) and King v. W. R. Hall Transportation 
and Storage Co., 641 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1982) holding that under 
the Colorado statute, the lower court had no jurisdiction to 
add new defendants after the expiration of the limitation 
period. 714 P.2d at 292. See also, Seafirst Mortgage Corp. v. 
Specialty Concrete, 708 P.2d 1245 (Wyo. 1985); Thompson 
Plumbing Company, Inc. v. J.E.C., Inc., 422 N.W.2d 26 
(Minn.App, 1988); Hasek v. Terrene Excavators, Inc., 723 P.2d 
1153 (Wash. App. 1986). This Court's September 6 opinion (at 
p. 20, n. 15) attempts to distinguish th$ decisions of other 
jurisdictions prohibiting joinder of defendants in mechanic's 
lien actions after the expiration of the limitation period, on 
the basis that their statutes are dissimilar to the Utah 
statute. However, the Colorado statute (a copy of which is 
attached hereto as Addendum MC") is also a jurisdictional 
statute that requires the recording of a lis pendens. 
The interpretation of § 38-1-11 offered by defendants 
adequately protects the interests of lien claimants as well. A 
lien claimant can protect itself by a search of the public 
records before filing suit or recording the lis pendens, in 
order to determine the identities of those claiming an interest 
of record in the property, such as Valley Bank, who should be 
named as defendants. If one of those defendants transfers its 
interest after the recording of the lis pendens, or to a party 
with actual knowledge of the suit, defendants' interpretation 
would allow the transferee to be added even after the 
limitation period expires. This interpretation is fair to all 
parties. The Court's September 6 interpretation is not. 
IV. 
THE COURT'S OPINION OVERLOOKED SEVERAL ISSUES 
REGARDING ENTITLEMENT TO ATTORNEYS' FEES TAXED 
AS COSTS UNDER § 38-1-18 AND RULE 54(d)(1). 
The Court ruled at p. 21, n.18 that Cottonwood Thrift 
was not entitled to its attorneys' fees as the prevailing party 
under § 38-1-18 because fees were not requested in the motion 
for summary judgment* However, this ruling does not address 
the Court's prior decision in Palombi v. D.& C. Builders, 22 
Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325 (1969), and related cases discussed 
at pp. 38-39 of defendants' brief, holding that attorneys' fees 
are mandatory under the statute and do not even need to be 
requested in the pleadings. The Court also failed to address 
defendants' arguments that § 38-1-18 taxes attorneys' fees as 
costs, and that under Rule 54(d)(1) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, costs need not be assessed in favor of the 
prevailing party until after appeal. Defendants certainly were 
not required to ask for costs in their summary judgment motion 
in order to preserve their right to costs. Moreover, in 
defendants' respective answers to plaintiff's Amended 
Complaint, all three defendants prayed for both costs and 
attorneys' fees. Accordingly, Cottonwood Thrift is entitled to 
its attorneys' fees in the District Court and on this appeal, 
as are Valley Bank and/or Copper State Thrift, in the event 
they prevail on one or more of the above issues on rehearing. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court's September 6 Opinion radically liberalizes 
Utah mechanic's lien law in a number of significant respects. 
However, the Court's analysis overlooked or misapprehended 
several important points that should be reconsidered. 
Defendants respectfully urge that their Petition for Rehearing 
be granted. 
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ORME, Court of Appeals Judge: 
Projects Unlimited, Inc., appeals from a summary 
judgment invalidating its mechanic's lien against the 
interests of Copper State Thrift & Loan Comoanv. v 9 n — »-
& Trust Company, and Cottonwood Thrift & Loan Company, Inc. 
We affirm the summary judgment as to Cottonwood Thrift, but 
reverse as to Copper State and Valley Bank. 
I. FACTS 
Bradshaw Development Company, Inc. ("Bradshaw"), 
owned a parcel of land, the Highland Orchards property, which 
it planned to develop into the Highland Orchards Condominium 
project. The property was divided into two parcels with the 
objective of constructing condominiums in two phases—phase I 
and phase II. Phase I, when completed, would consist of 
eighteen condominium units. Bradshaw engaged Projects 
Unlimited, Inc. (-Projects"), to construct some of the 
phase I units. In September 1982, Bradshaw and Projects 
entered into a contract for the construction of two 
units—FF-6-A1 and FF-6-B1, hereinafter referred to as 
units 1 and 2. Those parties entered into a second contract 
in April 1983 concerning the contruction of six additional 
units—FF-5-Al, FF-5-B1, FF-11-A1, FF-11-A2, FF-11-B1, and 
FF-11-B2, hereinafter referred to as units 3 through 8, 
respectively. The contracts allocated prices on a per-unit 
basis. 
Copper State Thrift & Loan Company financed 
construction of the eight units. The Copper State loan to 
Bradshaw was secured by two trust deeds. The first deed was 
recorded in December 1982 and covered units 1 and 2. The 
second deed was recorded in June 1983 and covered units 3 
through 8. 
Relying on the terms of its loan agreement with 
Bradshaw, Copper State refused to advance additional funds to 
Bradshaw in June 1983. Sometime thereafter, Bradshaw stopped 
making payments to Projects. On October 7, 1983, Projects 
ceased construction with a substantial balance still owing to 
Projects. Bradshaw did not record its condominium 
declaration until August 1983. 
During construction, units 1, 2, and 3 were sold. 
The sales of units 1 and 2 were financed by Valley Bank & 
Trust Company, which recorded trust deeds on those units in 
May 1983. Copper State subordinated its December 1982 trust 
deed to the May 1983 trust deeds of Valley Bank. The sale of 
unit 3 was financed by Western Savings & Loan Company, which 
is not a party to this appeal. After construction was 
halted, units 4 and 5 were sold. The sales of these units 
were financed by Cottonwood Thrift & Loan Company and secured 
by trust deeds recorded in December 1983. 
In November 1983, Projects recorded a notice of 
mechanic's lien against the Highland Orchards property. The 
notice described Bradshaw as the owner of the subject 
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property- The lien notice described the property by a metes 
and bounds description including all of the phase I and 
phase II property-1 The notice did not describe the eight 
constructed units, by employing their descriptions as used in 
the condominium declaration or otherwise, nor did it allocate 
unpaid amounts attributable to each unit- The notice did not 
distinguish between work performed under the September 1982 
and April 1983 contracts. The notice of lien cited the 
construction starting date as October 10, 1982, and the 
ending date as October 7, 1983. Although the notice of lien 
contained the signature and seal of a notary and the date of 
notarization, it did not give the notary's address or 
commission expiration date. 
Bradshaw and Projects negotiated to release from the 
lien units 4 and 5, financed by Cottonwood Thrift. The lien 
release specifically stated that units 4 and 5 were released 
from the scope of the lien in exchange for the payment of 
$90,000. Thereafter, Projects filed an amended notice of 
lien- The amended notice was essentially identical to the 
initial notice except that $85,000 was added to the "credits 
and offsets" figure and subtracted from the "balance owing" 
figure. The same metes and bounds description was used to 
describe the property. The amended notice did not exempt 
units 4 and 5 from the property description, but attached to 
it were a map of the entire condominium project and a copy of 
the partial release. 
Projects commenced an action to foreclose the lien 
and recorded a lis pendens in March 1984. The complaint 
alleged that Bradshaw had breached its contracts with 
Projects. The complaint also called for a determination of 
priorities among the various claimants. Valley Bank was not 
named as a defendant in the complaint but had actual 
knowledge of the action at least by August 1984, when it 
reviewed a title report showing Projects' lis pendens and 
initiated relevant correspondence with Projects. On May 24, 
1985, almost twenty months after it ceased construction, 
Projects filed an amended complaint which joined Valley Bank 
and others as defendants. Bradshaw failed to answer either 
complaint, and a default judgment was entered against it in 
December 1985. 
Copper State, Cottonwood Thrift, Valley Bank, and 
Western Savings ("the Banks") moved for summary judgment on 
the remaining claims. They collectively argued that 
Projects' lien was invalid under the mechanic's lien statute 
and under the Condominium Ownership Act. Essentially, their 
1. Accordingly, the metes and bounds description was not 
confined to the property on which the eight units constructed 
by Projects were located. However, it appears from the record 
that the only new structures on any part of the Highland 
Orchards property were the units constructed by Projects. 
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arguments under the mechanic's lien statute were that 
(1) the jurat lacked the notary's address and the date her 
commission expired, (2) the notice describes more property 
than was actually subject to the lien, (3) the notice 
describes property which Bradshaw initially did not own, and 
(4) the lien did not distinguish between work performed 
under the September 1982 and April 1983 contracts. The 
Banks also argued that the Condominium Ownership Act 
required Projects to file a separate lien on each 
condominium unit as described in the condominium declaration. 
Valley Bank also argued that Projects had failed to 
join it as a defendant within the statutorily prescribed 
time and was therefore barred from later amending its 
complaint to add that bank as a defendant. Moreover, 
Cottonwood Thrift argued that it was not a proper party to 
the suit because Projects had released the units it financed 
from the scope of the lien. Projects filed a cross-motion 
for partial summary judgment on its claim against Copper 
State, its construction lender. 
The trial court granted the Banks' summary judgment -* 
motions and denied Projects' motion. The court concluded 
that (1) Projects had unequivocally released from the lien's 
coverage the units financed by Cottonwood Thrift, 
(2) Projects failed to join Valley Bank as a party within 
the required time, and (3) the lien was invalid due to 
improper notarization "and on grounds otherwise set forth in 
the moving defendants' memoranda on file." 
On appeal, Projects challenges each of the trial 
court's conclusions. Primarily, it argues that Utah does 
not require a lien notarization to contain the notary's 
address and/or commission expiration date. 
The Banks assert the same arguments on appeal that 
they asserted in the trial court. In particular, they argue 
that we should affirm the trial court's decision on the 
notarization issue. Moreover, the Banks assert that, even 
assuming we were to agree with Projects on the notarization 
issue, we can and should affirm the summary judgment due to 
other failures in the lien notice. And indeed, "we may 
affirm trial court decisions on any proper ground(s), 
despite the trial court's having assigned another reason for 
its ruling." Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 
892, 895 (Utah 1988); see also State v. One 1979 Pontiac 
Trans Am, 771 P.2d 682, 684 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The Banks 
also cross-appeal, seeking an award of attorney fees in the 
district court and on appeal. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
••Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine 
issue of material fact exists and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.- Transamerica Cash 
Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc.. 789 P.2d 24, 25 
(Utah 1990); see Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In our determination 
of whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment, 
we must review the facts in the light most favorable to the 
losing party. E,gt, Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. 
v. Blomouist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). Moreover, we 
review the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness 
and give no particular deference to that court's view of the 
law. Ifl. 
III. MECHANIC'S LIENS GENERALLY 
We begin our analysis by recognizing that "[t]he 
purpose of the mechanic's lien act is remedial in nature and 
seeks to provide protection to laborers and materialmen who 
have added directly to the value of the property of another 
by their materials or labor." Calfler grpSt COt Vt Anderson, 
652 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1982). On the other hand, we 
recognize that liens create "an encumbrance on property that 
deprives the owner of his ability to convey clear title and 
impairs his credit," First Sec* Mtg, COt vt Hansen, 631 P.2d ^  
919, 922 (Utah 1981), a fact the importance of which is 
magnified by the pre-recordation priority accorded a valid 
mechanic's lien. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5 (1988). State 
legislatures and courts attempt to balance these competing 
interests through their mechanic's lien statutes and judicial 
interpretations thereof. 
Mechanic's liens are purely statutory, and lien 
claimants may only acquire a lien by complying with the 
statutory provisions authorizing them. Utah Sav. & Loan 
Assoc, v. Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 338, 366 P.2d 598, 600 
(1961). However, Utah courts have recognized that 
substantial compliance with these provisions is all that is 
required.2 Chase v. Dawson, 117 Utah 295, 296, 215 P.2d 
390, 390 (1950); see also Graff v. Boise Cascade Corp., 660 
P.2d 721, 722 (Utah 1983). Moreover, we have stated that 
"[a] lien once acquired by labor performed on a building with 
the consent of the owner should not . . • be defeated by 
technicalities, when no rights of others are infringed, and 
no express command of the statute is disregarded." Eccles 
Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 Utah 241, 249, 87 P. 713, 716 (1906) 
(quoting 20 Am. & Eng. Encyclopedia of Law 276); see also 
Mickelsen v. Craiqco, Inc., 767 P.2d 561, 563 (Utah 1989). 
Courts from other states also subscribe to this view. See, 
e,qt, H.A.M.S. Co. v. Electrical Contractors of Alaska, Inc., 
563 P.2d 258, 263 (Alaska 1977); Horseshoe Estates v. 2M Co., 
713 P.2d 776, 781 (Wyo. 1986). 
2. The Banks do not argue that Projects completely failed to 
comply with any of the particular requirements of Utah Code 
Ann. § 38-1-7 (1983). Rather, they argue that Projects' 
efforts did not substantially comply with!the statutes. 
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Although courts have differing opinions about how 
liberally to construe provisions within their mechanic's lien 
statutes, "the modern trend is to dispense with arbitrary 
rules which have no demonstrable value in a particular fact 
situation.-3 Consolidated Elec. Distribs., Inc. v. Jepson 
Elec. Contracting, Inc.. 272 Or. 376, 380, 537 P.2d 80, 83 
(1975). Utah has followed this trend both in the legislature 
and in the courts. A legislative example of this trend is 
the 1985 amendment to section 38-1-7 of the mechanic's lien 
statute. The 1985 amendment greatly simplified the 
mechanic's lien notice, dispensing with several of the more 
cumbersome lien notice requirements.4 One judicial example 
of this trend is Mickelsen, in which this court clarified the 
lien verification process and dispensed with the notion that 
the claimant's verification required any formal ritual. 767 
P.2d at 563. 
3. This trend is not confined to this area of the law but can 
be seen in others as well. See, e.g., Tech-Fluid Servs., Inc. 
vt Gavilan Operating, Inc, 787 P.2d 1328 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). In Tech-Fluid, the Utah Court of Appeals took a 
similar position in the area of redemption. The court 
concluded that where the provisions in the redemption statute 
are "procedural in nature and do not affect any substantive 
rights of the purchaser . . . [substantial] compliance is all 
that is necessary." Id. at 1334. 
4. The current version of section 38-1-7 provides in 
pertinent part: 
(2) This notice shall contain a statement 
setting forth the following information: 
(a) the name of the reputed owner if 
known or, if not known, the name of the 
record owner; 
(b) the name of the person by whom he 
was employed or to whom he furnished the 
equipment or material; 
(c) the time when the first and last 
labor or service was performed or the 
first and last equipment or material was 
furnished; 
(d) a description of the property, 
sufficient for identification; and 
(e) the signature of the lien 
claimant or his authorized agent and an 
acknowledgment or certificate . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (Supp. 1990). Requirements under the 
1984 version of this provision which are no longer part of the 
statute include actual verification of the statements in the 
lien notice, "a statement of [the claimant's] demand after 
deducting all just credits and offsets . . . [, and] a 
statement of the terms, time given and conditions of his 
contract . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (Supp. 1983). 
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With these general principles in mind, we turn to 
the particular arguments in this case. We must determine 
whether the rigorous interpretations ur^ed by the Banks are 
necessary to protect the interests of the parties in the 
instant situation. Unless we find that Projects' alleged 
failures have compromised a purpose of the mechanic's lien 
statute, those failures will be viewed $s technical, and in 
the absence of any prejudice, we will ubhold the lien.5 
IV. INVALIDITY OF THE LIEN UNDER SECTIONS 38-1-7 AND -8 
Sections 38-1-7 and 38-1-8 of 0tah's mechanic's lien 
statute identify the statutory elements of a lien notice. At 
the time the dispute arose, section 38-^-7 provided that 
every notice of lien recorded with the county recorder must 
contain 
a notice of intention to hold and claim a 
lien, and a statement of his demand after 
deducting all just credits and offsets, 
with the name of the reputed owner if known 
or if not known, the name of the record 
owner, and also the name of the person by 
whom he was employed or to whoni he 
furnished the material, with a statement of 
the terms, time given and conditions of his 
contract, specifying the time when the 
first and last labor was performed, or the 
first and last material was furbished, and 
also a description of the property to be 
charged with the lien, sufficient for 
identification, which claim must be 
verified by the oath of himself or of some 
other person. 
5. It is important to emphasize the sco^e of this opinion. 
Our focus is of course upon the particular parties and 
particular facts in this case, but it is further narrowed by 
the "as a matter of law" standard implicit in reviewing 
summary judgments. It may well be that the same lien notices 
would have worked significant prejudice qn other parties not 
before us, such as owners of, or lenders secured by, the 
phase II parcel to which Projects had no valid claim. Thus it 
is entirely possible that we would invalidate this same notice 
as it applied to another party who could demonstrate 
prejudice. Cf^ . Horseshoe Estates v, 2M (fc., 713 P.2d 776, 781 
(Wyo. 1986) (holding lien sufficient as against party who 
failed to demonstrate prejudice or that it was misled). It is 
even conceivable that the Banks, or some of them, could 
demonstrate actual prejudice in the context of a trial. At 
this juncture, however, we only consider the Banks' contention 
that the liens are so flawed as to simply) be void, regardless 
of any actual prejudice. 
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Utah Code Ann, § 38-1-7 (Supp. 1983).6 Section 38-1-8 
provided: 
Liens against two or more buildings or 
other improvements owned by the same person 
may be included in one claim; but in such 
case the person filing the claim must 
designate the amount claimed to be due to 
him on each of such buildings or other 
improvements. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-8 (1988). 
A. Failure of the Jurat 
At the time the dispute arose, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 38-1-7 (Supp. 1983) provided that every notice of lien 
-must be verified by the oath of [the lien claimant] or of 
some other person.- The district court found that a proper 
verification under section 38-1-7 required compliance with 
Utah Code Ann. § 46-1-8 (1953), which provided: -To all 
acknowledgments, oaths, affirmations and instruments of 
every kind taken and certified by a notary public he shall 
affix to his signature his official title and his place of 
residence and the date on which his commission expires.-
The court then concluded that the notary's failure to 
include her address and commission expiration date in the 
jurat invalidated the verification, which made the lien 
void. We disagree. 
Initially, we note that verification is an 
essential part of a lien notice and Hnot a hypertechnicality 
that we can discount.- First Sec. Mta. Co. v. Hansen, 631 
P.2d 919, 922 (Utah 1981).' Verification by the lien 
claimant was thought necessary so that -[f]rivolous, 
unfounded, and inflated claims can thereby be minimized, and 
the prejudgment property rights of the [property owners] 
receive their due protection.- Jjl. Verification 
accomplishes this purpose by creating -the possibility of 
perjury prosecution for verifying a false lien claim.-
H.A.M.S. Co. v. Electrical Contractors of Alaska. Inc.. 563 
P.2d 258, 264 (Alaska 1977) (lien must be signed by 
claimant; corporate acknowledgment insufficient). 
Although the 1983 mechanic's lien statute requires 
verification, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (Supp. 1983), it does 
6. Section 38-1-7 has been amended since 1983. See supra 
note 4. 
7. In First Security Mortgage, a lien notice was held invalid 
because the lien claimant failed to sign the oath. The notice 
was insufficient even though the notary had signed the 
certificate. See also Worthinoton & Kimball Constr. Co. v. 
C & A Dev. Co., 777 P.2d 475 (Utah 1989). 
not state any particular procedure for verification. Those 
procedures have developed judicially in cases like First 
Security Mortgage. One of the most recent and instructive 
cases defining these procedures is Mickelsen v. Craigco, 
IJUL^, 767 P.2d 561 (Utah 1989), decided after the trial court 
made its ruling in this case. In Mickelsen, we listed the 
essential elements for a proper verification: "(1) [T]here 
must be a correct written oath or affirmation, and (2) it 
must be signed by the affiant in the presence of a notary or 
other person authorized to take oaths, and (3) the latter 
must affix a proper jurat.m Id. at 564. The Banks do not 
contest that an oath was made or that it was signed before a 
notary. They simply argue that the notary failed to affix a 
"proper jurat" because she omitted her address and the 
expiration date of her commission. 
The Banks would have us adopt a position requiring 
strict compliance with the notary public statute in order to 
satisfy the verification requirement of the mechanic's lien 
statute as expounded in Mickelsen. We decline to adopt this 
position. A jurat is "merely evidence of the fact that the 
oath was properly taken before the duly authorized officer." 
50 C.J.S. Jurat 705 (1947); see also stern vt Poarfl of 
Elections, 14 Ohio St. 2d 175, 181, 237 N.E.2d 313, 317 
(1968); Craio v. State, 232 Ind. 293, 295, 112 N.E.2d 296, 
297 (1953) (purpose is to evidence that oath was made before 
authorized officer). In view of this principle, because the 
jurat in this case clearly evidenced that the oath was given 
before a notary, it should be considered adequate. And even 
assuming that the legislature intended the inclusion of a 
jurat which conformed with the notary statute,8 substantial 
compliance would certainly be sufficient to satisfy that 
requirement. E.g., Chase v. Dawson, 117 Utah 295, 296, 215 
P.2d 390, 390 (1950). 
In this case, the jurat contained the notary's 
signature, the date, and her official seal. These items were 
sufficient to evidence the fact that the document had been 
verified. Moreover, anyone who questioned the validity of 
the notarization could certainly confirm its authenticity 
with the simplest inquiry. Thus, we find that the lien's 
notarization substantially complied with the mechanic's lien 
and notary statutes. See, e.g., Georgia Lumber Co. v. 
Harrison Constat Cow 103 w. va. l, 5, 136 S.E. 399, 401 
(1927) (notice sufficient though notary failed to affix 
official seal in contravention of statute); Stern, 237 N.E.2d 
at 317-19 (failure of notary to affix signature to jurat did 
not invalidate affidavit). 
8. In 1989, the legislature amended the mechanic's lien 
statute to specifically provide a particular jurat form. The 
current statute requires •'an acknowledgment or certificate as 
required under Chapter 3, Title 57." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 38-1-7(2)(e) (Supp. 1990). 
Q 
The purpose of the verification requirement is to 
assure that lien claimants file legitimate claims. First 
Sec, Mtg,, 631 P.2d at 922; see also H.A.M.S., 563 P.2d at 
264• In First Security Mortgage and H.A.M.S., liens were 
held invalid because the lien notices did not contain the 
signature of the claimants but simply the signature of a 
notary attesting to the oath of the claimants. Unlike those 
cases, the president of Projects signed an oath that the 
contents of the lien notice were true and the notary attested 
to this fact. We see no policy reason why the notary's 
technical failure to include her address and commission 
expiration date increased, in any way, the likelihood that 
Projects would file a frivolous claim, especially since her 
failure presumably occurred after the verification was signed 
by the president. 
For the above reasons, we find that the lien notice 
substantially complied with the "proper jurat" requirement 
established in Mickelsen.9 
B. Other Grounds 
Though we disagree with the trial court's legal 
conclusion on the notarization issue, we may still affirm the 
summary judgment based upon one of the other failures in the 
lien notice. The Banks argue that the lien notice is invalid 
because the metes and bounds description in the notice 
(1) covers more than one condominium unit without 
specifically referencing each, (2) describes more property 
than is actually subject to the lien, and (3) describes 
property which was not initially owned by Bradshaw and 
because the notice fails to distinguish between work 
completed under the two separate contracts. 
These other grounds essentially challenge the 
descriptive contents of the lien notice. The purpose for 
descriptive terms in a lien notice is to adequately inform 
interested parties of the existence and scope of the lien. 
&££ Park Citv Meat Co. v. Comstock Silver Mining Co., 36 Utah 
145, 155, 103 p. 254, 260 (1906); Eccles Lumber Co, Yt 
Martin, 31 Utah 241, 249, 87 P. 713, 717 (1906); see also 
Parsons v. Keenev, 98 Conn. 745, 749, 120 A. 505, 507 (1923); 
Beall Pipe & Tank Corp. v. Tumac Intermountain, Inc., 108 
9. We recognize that this conclusion is inconsistent with In 
re Williamson, 43 Bankr. 813 (D. Utah 1984), on which the 
trial court heavily relied. In Williamson, the bankruptcy 
court found that each element listed in section 46-1-8 was an 
essential part of a notary's certificate even when made on a 
mechanic's lien. Id. at 823. Utah law was admittedly unclear 
on this point when Williamson was decided. Nonetheless, we 
disagree with the analysis in Williamson and hold to the 
contrary. 
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Idaho 487, 490, 700 P.2d 109, 112 (Ct. App. 1985); 
Consolidated Elec. Distribs., Inc. v. Jeoson Elec, 
Contracting, Inc., 272 Or. 376, 382, 537 P.2d 80, 82 (1975). 
Thus, courts look to see whether interested parties have been 
informed of the existence of the lien and whether the lien 
has misled or prejudiced those parties. See Eccles, 87 P. at 
717; see also Beall, 700 P.2d at 112; Hprseshoe Estates v. 2M 
Co., 713 P.2d 776, 781 (Wyo. 1986). When lien notices have 
sufficiently informed interested persons that a lien exists 
on identifiable property and the complaining party has not 
been misled by the notice, the purpose of the provisions has 
not been thwarted and courts are inclined to find substantial 
compliance. See, e.g., Horseshoe. 713 P.2d at 781. 
As we analyze each of the Banks' challenges to the 
lien description, our main purpose is to determine whether 
the notice adequately informed the Banks of the existence of 
the lien and whether the Banks were prejudiced, as a matter 
of law, by the descriptive terms. "Absent any such claim of 
prejudice or being misled in any manner by the description[s] 
which [appear] in the lien statement, we [will] hold that it 
was sufficient." Id,.10 -* 
1. Inclusion Of More Than One Unit Without Designating Each 
Section 38-1-7 provides, with oiir emphasis, that 
every notice of lien must contain "a description of the 
property to be charged with the lien, sufficient for 
identification." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (Supp. 1983). 
Section 38-1-8 provides in pertinent part: "Liens against 
two or more buildings . . • owned by the same person or 
persons may be included in one claim; but in such case the 
person filing the claim must designate therein the amount 
claimed to be due to him on each of such buildings." Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-1-8 (1988). The Banks argue that these two 
sections require Projects to allocate its contract claims 
among all the relevant condominium unitsJ 
We begin our analysis with the first of three cases 
dealing with section 38-1-8 and its predecessor. In Eccles 
Lumber Co. v. Martin. 31 Utah 241, 87 P. 713 (1906), the 
owner of property on which a mechanic's lien had been filed 
argued that a lien notice was invalid because it failed to 
separately state amounts due on different structures. This 
court construed the predecessor statute to section 38-1-8, 
which contains language identical to that in section 38-1-8, 
and definitively stated that a blanket lien was not invalid 
for failing to allocate the amounts due. Eccles, 87 P. at 
10. It is not enough for the Banks to show that other persons 
might have been prejudiced by the lien notice. In order to 
prevail, the Banks must show that they we^ ce somehow misled or 
prejudiced. See supra note 5. 
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717. The lien claimant's failure did "not affect nor concern 
the owner of the property." X&. He. was "fairly informed of 
the amount claimed against his property.- ill. Rather, 
allocation was necessary "to protect the interests of the 
lien claimants between and among themselves." Id. 
The next case in which we discussed the issue was 
United States Building & Loan Association v. Midvale Home 
Finance Corp.. 86 Utah 506, 44 P.2d 1090 (1935). In Midvale 
Home, a corporation promoted the construction and sale of 
homes in a subdivision. When the corporation defaulted on 
its construction loan, the loan company brought suit to 
foreclose its mortgage on the subdivision property. We were 
called upon to determine the priorities among the mortgage, 
several mechanic's liens, and the interests of the individual 
home purchasers. The home purchasers argued that they had 
priority over the lien claimants because the lien claimants 
did not allocate amounts due on the various houses 
constructed in the subdivision. The purchasers attempted to 
distinguish Eccles on the basis that Eccles involved only the 
original owner. We rejected this argument, concluding that 
the mechanic's liens "attached before any of the claims of 
the unit holders." iiL. at 519, 44 P.2d at 1096. 
The final case in which we dealt with this subject 
was Utah Savings & Loan Association v. Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 
335, 366 P.2d 598 (1961). In Mecham, a claimant filed a lien 
covering numerous subdivision lots. Some of the lots were 
owned by the Mechams, and some, by another individual. The 
lien failed to allocate the amounts due on each lot. Mecham 
argued that the lien was invalid. We affirmed the general 
rules in Eccles and Midvale Home but concluded that the lien 
claimant could only aggregate claims if the various lots and 
structures described in the lien were owned by the same 
person. 
As in Midvale Home, the Banks in this case acquired 
their interests in the property subsequent to the time the 
mechanic's lien attached. Unlike the situation in the Mecham 
case, Bradshaw was apparently the only owner of the affected 
property when the lien attached, i.e., when construction 
started. Finally, the Banks do not argue that the lien 
misled them as to the claimed lien, nor have they 
demonstrated any prejudice from the aggregation of the claims 
in this case. Thus, we hold that the lien notice was not 
invalid, at least as against the Banks, simply because 
Projects failed to segregate the contract amounts 
attributable to individual condominium units. 
2. Describing More Property Than Was Subject To Lien 
The Banks argue that even if Projects was not 
required to segregate the claims attributable to each 
No. 860340 12 
condominium unit, the lien was invalid tor describing more 
property than was properly subject to the lien. However, the 
general rule is that the inclusion of 
more land than that to which the lien may 
properly attach does not vitiate the lien 
upon so much of the land as is encompassed 
within the description and to which a lien 
may properly attach, at least if the 
description is not fraudulent or grossly 
misleading and innocent third parties are 
not affected. 
Annotation, Sufficiency of notice, claim, or statement of 
Mechanic's lien with respect to description or location of 
real property, 52 A.L.R.2d 12, 83 (1957); see also Adams Tree 
Serv., Inc. v. Transamerica Title Ins. go., 20 Ariz. App. 
214, 511 P.2d 658, 663 (1973) (valid portion of lien can be 
severed from invalid portion); Beall Pipe & Tank Corp. v. 
Tumac Intermountain, Inc., 108 Idaho 487, 700 P.2d 109, 112 
(Ct. App. 1985) ("the land properly subject to the lien is 
for the court to determine"); Park City Meat Co. v. Comstock 
Silver Mining Co.. 36 Utah 145, 103 P. 254, 259 (1909) 
("court may limit the amount [of land] to what may be 
necessary-); Horseshoe Estates v. 2M Co., 713 P.2d at 781 
(lien which contained "no adequate description of the 
property- upheld where no claim of prejudice or being 
misled); Enole v. First Nat'l Bank. 590 P.2d 826, 832 (Wyo. 
1979) (validating lien which described entire ranch rather 
than small parcel upon which house was c0nstructed since no 
showing of prejudice by bank). 
We are persuaded that no purpose of the mechanic's 
lien statute would be served by totally invalidating a lien 
which overdescribes the property upon which the lien can 
properly attach. There is no evidence in the record to 
suggest that the description was fraudulent. Moreover, the 
Banks do not argue that they were misled or prejudiced by the 
description. Therefore, we cannot say, as a matter of law, 
that the overly broad description results in the lien's 
invalidity as to the Banks.^ 
11. At the risk of unnecessary repetition, we reiterate that 
in holding that the description does not invalidate the lien 
as to the Banks, we do not mean to suggest that the result 
would be the same for others. The lien, for example, is 
ineffective as to the phase II property, in which the Banks 
claim no interest, and inclusion of that property in the lien 
notices would subject Projects to appropriate relief in a 
slander of title action. See supra note 5. 
13 No. 860340 
3. Describing Property Not Initially Owngfl Bv Bradshaw 
The Banks argue that the description may have 
included property not even owned by Bradshaw at the time the 
work was commenced on the project. They argue, citing 
Mecham, that this fact alone invalidates the lien. We do not 
think Mecham stands for this proposition. In Mecham, we 
invalidated the lien because "the materials, for which claim 
was made, were not furnished upon buildings owned by the same 
person or persons.- 12 Utah 2d at 339, 366 P.2d at 601 
(emphasis added). Here, the Banks do not argue that any of 
the materials or labor went into the construction of 
buildings not initially owned by Bradshaw but simply that 
some of the land included in the notice was not owned by 
Bradshaw at the outset of construction. 
We fail to see much of a distinction for this case 
between a lien which includes too much property owned by the 
same owner and too much property part of which is owned by 
another person. In either event, the court can determine 
what part of the property is actually subject to the lien. 
3eall Pipe & Tank CorPt vf Tumac Intermovmtaini Inct, 108 
Idaho at 498, 700 P.2d at 112. Whether the other person 
would have an action for slander of title is a separate 
matter. See supra note 11. Again, the Banks do not complain 
that they were actually misled or prejudiced by the notice. 
Thus, under these facts, the overly expansive property 
description did not compromise any purpose of the statute and 
does not invalidate the lien as to the Banks. 
4. Inclusion Of Separate Contracts In One Lien 
The Banks also argue that the lien must fail because 
the construction work on the property was performed under two 
separate contracts. Although the Banks advance this 
argument, they fail to cite much authority to support their 
position or to give any policy reasons for adopting such a 
rule. Utah courts have not addressed this question before, 
and there is a split of authority among other jurisdictions 
which have considered it. 
Some courts have held that when work is performed 
under separate contracts, the work may not be aggregated into 
a single lien claim. Rather, a separate notice must be 
recorded for each contract. See, e.g., F.A. Drew Glass Co. 
v. Eagle Mill. 1 Kan. App. 614, 42 P. 387, 390 (1895); 
Schivelv v. Radell, 227 Pa. 434, 441, 76 A. 209, 211 (1910). 
Other jurisdictions, however, have allowed lien claimants to 
file a single notice even though the work was performed under 
more than one contract. See, e.g., Fixture & Plumbing Co.. 
131 Ala. 256, 31 So. 26, 28 (1901); Alabama State Fair & 
Agricultural Ass'n v> Alabama Gas Booth v, Pendola, 88 cal. 
36, 25 P. 1101, 1101 (1891); Parsons v. Keenev, 98 Conn. 745, 
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749, 120 A. 505, 507 (1923); Saint Joseph's College v. 
Morrison. Inc., 158 Ind. App. 272, 302 N.E.2d 865, 874-76 
(1973); Consolidated Elec. Distrib., Inc. v. Jenson Elec. 
Contracting, Inc., 272 Or, 376, 537 P.2d 80 (1975); Fischer 
v. Meiroff, 192 Wis- 482, 484, 213 N.W. 283, 285 (1927), 
After reviewing the various cases, we find more 
persuasive the cases which have allowed the aggregation of 
claims arising under more than one contract. In Consolidated 
Electric, one of the comparatively more recent cases, the 
Oregon Supreme Court allowed a lien claimant to file a single 
lien notice covering two contracts with separate owners. 
Although the court stated that it did not favor the practice, 
it noted that each owner was sufficiently notified of the 
lien against its property and no "prejudice [had] been 
suffered by the defendants in any material respect." 272 Or. 
at 383, 537 P.2d at 83. The holding of Consolidated Electric 
significantly departed from earlier Oregon case law. See, 
e.g., Dimitre Elec. Co. v. Paget, 175 Or. 72, 151 P.2d 630 
(1944). In changing its position, the Oregon court 
recognized that "the modern trend [in mechanic's lien law] is 
to dispense with arbitrary rules which h$ve no demonstrable 
value in a particular fact situation." Consolidated Elec. 
Dist., Inc., 272 Or. at 380, 537 P.2d at 82. 
The reasoning in Consolidated Electric makes sense, 
and we adopt that position in this case. Again, the Banks do 
not argue that the notice failed to adequately notify them of 
the existence of the lien or in any way prejudiced them. 
Thus, we hold that the inclusion of claims arising under two 
separate contracts in a single lien notice did not invalidate 
Projects' lien. 
5. Synunary 
The Banks do not seriously claim that any of the 
alleged description failures misled or prejudiced them. The 
lien notices, while not a model of clarity and precision, 
appear to have adequately^ accomplished the purposes of the 
statute as concerns the Banks. Thus, we hold that Projects' 
lien notice substantially complied with sections 38-1-7 and 
38-1-8 of the mechanic's lien statute. Accordingly, the lien 
is valid, at least as between the parties to this appeal. 
V. INVALIDITY OF THE LIEN UNDER SECTION 57-8-19 
The Banks also argue that the lien notice was 
invalid under the Condominium Ownership Act, which provides 
in pertinent part, with our emphasis: 
Subseouent to recording the declaration as 
provided in this act, and while the 
property remains subject to this act, n& 
15 
lien shall thereafter arise or be 
effective against the property. During 
such period liens or encumbrances shall 
arise or be created only against each unit 
« . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-19 (1953)• The Banks argue that 
Projects' lien arose and was effective only after 
recordation of the condominium declaration. Thus, they 
argue, Projects was required to file a notice of lien for 
each specific condominium unit. 
Utah appellate courts have not had an opportunity 
to interpret section 57-8-19 in this context. However, both 
the Montana and Wisconsin Supreme Courts have interpreted 
statutes nearly identical to Utah's in contexts similar to 
this case. See Hostetter v. Inland Dev. Corp., 172 Mont. 
167, 561 P.2d 1323 (1977); Stevens Constr. Corp. v. Draper 
Hall, Inc., 73 Wis. 2d 104, 242 N.W.2d 893 (1976). 
The facts in Hostetter. Stevens, and the instant 
case are essentially the same. In each case, the developer 
contracted for the construction of condominium units and 
construction work began. Thereafter, the developers filed 
condominium declarations. Some time later, the contractors 
filed mechanic's liens which described the entire property 
on which the condominium complex was constructed and failed 
to allocate separate amounts to the different units. In 
each case, the defendants argued that a blanket lien over 
the entire project was inappropriate once the condominium 
declaration had been filed. 
The courts in both Hostetter and Stevens held that 
the blanket lien was sufficient. Hostetter, 172 Mont, at 
173, 561 P.2d at 1326-27; Stevens, 73 Wis. 2d at 114, 242 
N.W.2d at 898. Both courts noted that the key factor was 
the point when the liens arose and became effective against 
the property; both courts held that this occurred at the 
commencement of construction. Hostetter, 172 Mont, at 
172-73, 561 P.2d at 1326; Stevens, 73 Wis. 2d at 114, 242 
N.W.2d at 898. The filing of the lien notice merely 
preserved and perfected the lien. Stevens, 73 Wis. 2d at 
114, 242 N.W.2d at 898. The only effect that the 
condominium declaration had was to make the blanket lien 
proportionately effective against each unit constructed 
under the subject contract along with its corresponding 
undivided interest in the common area. Hostetter, 172 Mont, 
at 174, 561 P.2d at 1327; Stevens, 73 Wis. 2d at 114, 242 
N.W.2d at 898. 
The Banks attempt to distinguish Hostetter and 
Stevens. They note that, unlike this case, the work in 
those cases was done under a single contract. They argue 
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that this fact alone should produce a different result, but 
they do not state the reasons for their conclusion. We have 
concluded that a lien notice may include work performed under 
separate contracts and fail to see why the result should be 
different when the work is performed on a condominium 
project.12 
We find the reasoning in Hostetter and Stevens sound 
and adopt their rationale. Section 57-8-19 does not affect 
the validity of the lien in this case. The lien arose and 
became effective when Projects commenced work on the 
project. As previously noted, the lien notice was sufficient 
to perfect that lien, making the lien valid at least as to 
the units properly subject to the lien and as between the 
parties to this appeal. The only effect of section 57-8-19 
and the intermediate filing of the declaration was to make 
the lien proportionately effective against each unit 
constructed under the subject contracts and each such unit's 
corresponding undivided interest in the common area. Having 
concluded that the lien notice is not facially invalid as to 
the Banks, we turn now to the separate arguments presented by 
Valley Bank and Cottonwood Thrift. -, 
VI. VALLEY BANK DISMISSAL 
The trial court granted summary judgment to Valley 
Bank on the basis of Utah Code Ann. § 38+1-11 (1988). That 
statute provides in pertinent part: 
Actions to enforce [mechanic's] liens must 
be begun within twelve months after the 
completion of the original contract, or the 
suspension of work thereunder for a period 
of thirty days. Within the twelve months 
herein mentioned the lien claimant shall 
file for record with the county recorder of 
each county in which the lien is recorded a 
notice of the pendency of the action, in 
the manner provided in actions affecting 
the title or right to possession of real 
property, or the lien shall be void, 
12. In Hostetter, the Montana court specifically noted that 
the blanket lien was effective against the entire condominium 
project because "the work was performed under one contract, 
and not a series of separate contracts for each unit." 
Hostetter v. Inland Dev. Corp., 172 Mont. 167, 170, 561 P.2d 
1323, 1325 (1977). Apparently, Montana courts have adopted 
the position that a single lien may not encompass work 
performed under multiple contracts. See Caird Ena'g Works v. 
Seven-up Gold Mining Co., Ill Mont. 471, 487-89, 111 P.2d 267, 
276 (1941). We have declined to adopt that position and thus 
disavow that aspect of the Hostetter decision. 
17 No. fififnan 
except as to persons who have been made 
parties to the action and persons having 
actual knowledge of the commencement of 
the action . . . . 
Projects commenced this action and recorded its 
lis pendens five months after it ceased construction, well 
within the statutory twelve-month period. It did not, 
however, add Valley Bank as a defendant until it filed its 
amended complaint, nearly twenty months after construction 
ceased. Valley Bank argued, and the trial court agreed, that 
section 38-1-11 is a statute of limitation13 which required 
Projects to name Valley Bank as a defendant within the 
twelve-month period, on pain of its action against Valley 
Bank being forever barred. We read section 38-1-11 
differently. 
Section 38-1-11 has two requirements which serve two 
different purposes. First, the statute requires the lien 
claimant to commence his action within twelve months of the 
completion of the project or suspension of work. See supra 
note 13. Valley Bank argues that the lien claimant is also 
required by this provision to join all persons having an 
interest in the property within the twelve-month period. 
However, the statute does not expressly require the lien 
claimant to do so and, on the contrary as hereafter 
explained, obviously contemplates the joinder of defendants 
not initially named after the expiration of the twelve-month 
period. 
The second "requirement" of section 38-1-11 is that 
the lien claimant file a lis pendens within the twelve-month 
period. However, the limited effect of a failure to comply 
with this requirement is expressly set forth in the statute. 
When a claimant fails to file the lis pendens within the 
13. Although both parties have characterized section 38-1-11 
as a statute of limitation, we do not view it strictly as 
such. Rather, it contains one of the requirements with which 
the claimant must comply ••before [that] party is entitled to 
the benefits created by the [mechanic's lien] statute.- AAA 
Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev. & Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289, 291 
(Utah 1986). The penalty for not commencing an action to 
enforce a mechanic's lien within the twelve-month period 
provided in section 38-1-11 is invalidation of the lien rather 
than preclusion of the claim as with a traditional statute of 
limitation. Seq. e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 (Supp. 
1986). The commencement requirement of section 38-1-11 serves 
as a substantive restriction on the lien action and, unlike a 
true statute of limitation, is not waived if not pleaded. 
AAA, 714 P.2d at 291. 
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twelve-month period, the lien itself is i^ot invalidated, but 
rather it is rendered void as to everyonte except those named 
in the action and those with actual knowledge of the 
action. By contrast, it follows logically, timely 
recordation of the lis pendens imparts constructive notice 
to all persons concerned with the property of the action to 
enforce the lien, see Utah Code Ann. § 70-40-2(1989), 
regardless of whether they were named as parties or had 
actual knowledge of the action. 
Valley Bank's contrary interpretation would render 
portions of the statute meaningless or nonsensical. See 
Millett v* CUE k Clinic Corp,, 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980) 
("[S]tatutory enactments are to be so coristrued as to render 
all parts thereof relevant and meaningful, and that 
interpretations are to be avoided which rfender some part of 
a provision nonsensical or absurd."). For one thing, it 
would be pointless to provide that a lien would be valid as 
against persons with actual knowledge of the action to 
enforce the lien who had not been named as parties in the 
action as filed within the twelve-month period unless it 
were fully anticipated that such parties could be brought 
into the action, by amendment, beyond the twelve-month 
period. It would make no sense to consider the lien to be 
valid as against such persons unless it cpuld be enforced 
against them by joining them in the action as previously 
commenced. Moreover, failure to join a defendant in the 
complaint as filed within the twelve-month period cannot be 
conclusively fatal to the claimant's ability to enforce the 
lien as against the defendant or it would be meaningless for 
the statute to refer to the continued effectiveness of the 
lien, even absent timely recordation of a lis pendens, as 
against nonparties, like Valley Bank in this case, who have 
actual knowledge of the action. 
We conclude that section 38-1-11 should be read as 
a whole to require a lien claimant to continence a mechanic's 
lien action and record a corresponding lis pendens within 
the twelve-month period. Commencing the action preserves 
the lien. Recording the lis pendens impacts constructive 
notice of the lien enforcement action to Everyone interested 
in the liened property. Only when the claimant fails to 
timely record the lis pendens can an interested person argue 
that it is not subject to the lien, and tfyen only if such 
person was not named as a party and did nc^ t have actual 
knowledge of the action. 
In this case, Projects commenced the action and 
filed the lis pendens within the required twelve-month 
period. Valley Bank was therefore subject to the lien14 
14. It is worth noting that even if Projects had not recorded 
its lis pendens timely, Valley Bank would still be subject to 
(Continued on page 20.) 
and could properly be joined by an appropriate amendment to 
the complaint as was done in this case. The trial court 
accordingly erred when it dismissed Valley Bank from the 
action,15 
VII. AMBIGUITY OF "PARTIAL- LIEN RELEASE 
The trial court granted Cottonwood Thrift & Loan 
Company's summary judgment motion on two grounds: First, the 
court concluded that, "based on undisputed facts," Cottonwood 
Thrift had reasonably relied upon the recorded lien release. 
Second, the court concluded that the effect of the release 
was clear on its face. Projects agues on appeal that the 
release was ambiguous. It also argues that reasonable 
reliance is a concept necessarily too fact-sensitive for 
disposition by summary judgment. 
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of 
law. E tg T / Morris v. Mountain States Telt & Telt Cof/ 658 
P.2d 1199, 1200 (Utah 1983). Moreover, the trial court must 
determine •'whether a contract is ambiguous . . . before it 
takes any evidence in clarification." Xfl. It follows, 
therefore, that if the contract is clear on its face, the 
trial court need not—and in fact should not—consider 
evidence of a contrary meaning. 
The release in this case stated in pertinent part 
that Projects "in consideration of [$90,000] . . . does 
hereby release, satisfy and discharge that certain claim of 
lien . . . against the following described real property." 
The release then described units 4 and 5. This language is 
susceptible of no other interpretation but that the two units 
(Footnote 14 continued.) 
the lien because it had actual knowledge of Projects' action 
by no later than August 1984, when it reviewed a title report 
disclosing the action and commenced a dialogue with Projects 
concerning the matter. 
15. Although Valley Bank directs our attention to California 
and Illinois decisions holding that a lien claimant may in no 
event add defendants after expiration of the dealine for 
filing a mechanic's lien action, we are not persuaded by those 
decisions. As previously noted, unlike California and 
Illinois statutes, section 38-1-11 is not a true statute of 
limitation. See supra note 13. Moreover, our statute is 
significantly different from the statutes in California and 
Illinois because it does not merely impose a dealine for 
commencement of the action, but goes on to delineate persons 
who will be subject to the lien even though not joined in the 
action within the twelve-month period. Our attention is drawn 
to no decision construing similar language in any other 
mechanic's lien statute. 
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were completely released from the scope of the lien,16 The 
trial court properly construed the release as a matter of law 
and properly declined to consider evidence of another 
intent• Consequently/ we affirm the trial court's decision 
to dismiss Cottonwood Thrift from the action,17 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The trial court's order and judgment of dismissal 
are affirmed only as they relate to Cottonwood Thrift.18 
As to Copper State and Valley Bank/ we reverse and remand for 
trial or other appropriate proceedings consistent with this 
decision. 
16. Projects argues that the release was ambiguous because 
the word "Partial" was added to the "Release of Lien" 
heading. However, in the context of this case, the release 
clearly was "partial" because it only released two of the 
eight units otherwise covered by the lien notice. We do not 
believe that the addition created any ambiguity in the 
instrument. 
In the determination of the real character 
of a contract/ courts will always look to 
its purpose rather than to the name given 
it by the parties, and where a conflict 
exists between a name attempted to be 
applied to a particular contract and the 
language of the contract itself/ the name 
will be rejected as inapplicable. 
17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 269 (1964) (footnote omitted). 
17. Because we agree that the release was clear and was not 
ambiguous/ we need not address Projects' reasonable reliance 
arguments. 
18. The Banks request on appeal that we award attorney fees 
based upon Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (1988)/ which provides: 
"In any action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter 
the successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable 
attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court/ which shall be taxed 
as costs in the action." In view of our holding/ except as 
concerns Cottonwood Thrift, determination of any party's 
"success" is clearly premature. In the case of Cottonwood 
Thrift/ we note that it, along with the other banks, did not 
request attorney fees as part of its motion for summary 
judgment. We will not entertain issues raised for the first 
time on appeal. Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title 
Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651/ 657 (Utah 1988). Therefore, we 
decline to consider Cottonwood Thrift's request for fees even 
though it has successfully defeated Projects' claims against 
it. 
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Chief Justice 
I. Daniel Stewai 
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ct, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
Durham, Justice, having disqualified herself, does 
not participate herein; Gregory K. Orme, Court of Appeals 
Judge, sat. 
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